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ABUSE OF DISCRETION: ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE
vs. JUDICIAL SURVEILLANCE
In 1958 the Supreme Court, in Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC,' re-
versed a Seventh Circuit decision postponing an FTC cease and desist
order.2 The Seventh Circuit had stayed enforcement on the ground
that the FTC had prosecuted the petitioner while allowing most of his
competitors to remain undisturbed, a situation which the court of
appeals felt would result in petitioner's "economic extinction." ' The
Supreme Court, in reversing, noted the broad discretion granted the
FTC in this area:
[T]he decision as to whether or not an order against one
firm to cease and desist from engaging in illegal price dis-
crimination should go into effect before others are similarly
prohibited depends on a variety of factors peculiarly within
the expert understanding of the Commission. . . . It is
clearly within the special competence of the Commission to
appraise the adverse effect on competition that might result
from postponing a particular order prohibiting continued
violations of the law. Furthermore, the Commission alone
is empowered to develop that enforcement policy best cal-
culated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress and
to allocate its available funds and personnel in such a way
as to execute its policy efficiently and economically.4
Having determined that the question of which potential violators
to prosecute is within the discretion of the FTC, the Court concluded
that such decisions by the Commission are reversible only for a "patent
abuse of discretion." 5 This latter conclusion is apparently compelled
by the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 10(a) of the APA
states:
1355 U.S. 411 (1958).
2 C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1957). The Supreme Court
concurrently affirmed an Eighth Circuit decision which had enforced a Commission
selective prosecution. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1957).
3 C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, supra note 2, at 42.
4355 U.S. at 413.
5 The question, then, of whether orders such as those before us should be
held in abeyance until the respondent's competitors are proceeded against is
for the Commission to decide . . .. in the absence of a patent abuse of
discretion.
Id. at 413-14. (Emphasis added.)
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Except so far as . . . (2) agency action is by law com-
mitted to agency discretion-(a) Any person suffering legal
wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any rele-
vant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof.'
On its face this section might appear to prohibit judicial review
of any question committed to agency discretion. Section 10(e),
however, provides that agency action may be set aside for "an abuse of
discretion," 7 which implies reviewability notwithstanding discretion
vested in the agency. In order to give a reasonable meaning to
section 10(e),8 and in light of legislative reluctance to exclude judicial
review,9 the most rational construction of section 10(a) would seem
to be that once a question has been committed to agency discretion,
the only ground for reversal would be an agency decision which is
"arbitrary," or in other words,'0 an abuse of discretion.'"
The question of what constitutes abuse of discretion, however, is
not an easy one. Clearly the existence of discretion in an agency
demands judicial deference to some agency decisions which the court
would have made differently in the first instance. "Abuse of discretion,"
then, must mean more than that the agency, after considering and
weighing all the relevant facts, struck a balance different from that
which the court would have reached. On the other hand, administrative
agencies are vested with discretion by Congress primarily because of
their expected expertise in divining and effectuating congressional
policy. The agency's expertise is probably only of value so long as
it weighs those considerations, and only those considerations, which
Congress intended that it take into account in effectuating the legis-
lative policy. Thus, if an agency were to include within its con-
sideration irrelevant factors,' or if it were to exclude a factor which
Congress intended it to consider in enforcing federal policy,"3 it would
have "abused" its discretion, because: 1) the agency would no longer
be acting under the congressional mandate; and 2) its value as an
IAdministrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a)
(1964).
7 Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)
(1964).
8 See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Aidicial Review, 65 COLUm. L.
REv. 55, 58-65 (1965).
9 See S. REP'. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945).
10 "[A]buse of discretion" is "arbitrary action not justifiable in . . . the cir-
cumstances." NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11
(6th Cir. 1960).
31 See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114
U. PA. L. Rxv. 783 (1966). But see Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Post-
script, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 823 (1966).
12 See JAFFE JUDiciAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIVE AcrroN 181-82 (1965).
13 Ibid.
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expert body-the reason for deference by the courts and for con-
gressional trust-would be lost.
A third way in which an agency might abuse its discretion would
be to give unreasonable weight to one or more relevant factors. 14
Congress presumably did not,'5 and possibly could not,' 6 delegate
authority to an agency to act arbitrarily or capriciously. Thus, if an
agency reached a completely unreasonable result after weighing the
relevant facts, the court should set that finding aside.' Admittedly
it is a delicate task for a court to decide that an agency acted arbi-
trarily despite the fact that it purported to have weighed all those
considerations, and only those considerations, which are relevant to
the congressional purpose; ' but the task is probably one which the
courts must be willing to perform if the vast advantages of adminis-
trative agencies are not to be lost through misuse. Because the balance
is so delicate, however, the courts should, and probably do, avoid
striking down agency action unless they feel competent to find that
the agency has clearly acted unreasonably, and thereby "abused its
discretion." 19
Recently, in Universal-Rundle Corp. v. FTC,?0 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was asked to stay a selective prosecu-
tion by the FTC similar to the one in Moog, and again granted a
stay. The court based its decision largely on three factors: 1) the
economic injury Universal would suffer from a cease and desist
order; 2 2) the fact that the order was of primary benefit not to the
public, but to Universal's competitors who could continue to sell at
unlawful discounts; 22 and 3) the fact that the Commission, having
directed itself at a widespread practice, prosecuted one of the smallest
market participants and one whose unlawful discounts were allegedly
the lowest of all the named competitors.'
14 See id. at 182.
15 See Berger, supra note 8, at 58-60.
16 Ibid.
17As stated by judge Magruder in McBee v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235, 237 (6th
Cir. 1961): "[An abuse of discretion is] a clear error of judgment in the conclusion
. . . reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors."
18 Sometimes a court might rest its finding of an abuse of discretion on the third
ground, but might really be drawing the inference either that the agency didn't con-
sider and give weight to a relevant factor, or that it gave improper weight to an
irrelevant factor. On the other hand, there may be cases in which the agency con-
siders a relevant factor but gives it a completely unreasonable weight. Professor
Jaffe cites the hypothetical example of an agency refusal to license a dairy because
it found a speck of dirt-the dirt is relevant, but it was given an unreasonable weight.
JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 12, at 182.
19 See, e.g., Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); Berger, supra
note 8, at 93-95.
20 352 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEK 3111 (U.S. Oct.
10, 1966) (No. 101).21 1d. at 833.




As noted above, the Supreme Court in Moog made clear that the
decision whether to prosecute selectively suspected violators is for the
agency, absent a "patent abuse of discretion." 24 The court in
Universal-Rundle noted the Moog opinion and decided that in this
case the FTC had abused its discretion.25 The question then is whether
the decision by the FTC in Universal-Rundle was an abuse of dis-
cretion as that term is explained above. 6  The court of appeals' three
major articulated grounds for staying the Commission order 2 7 do
not alone support a finding of abuse of discretion, for those three ele-
ments were largely present, and dismissed by the Court, in Moog.
The economic despair of petitioner in Universal-Rundle was certainly
no more critical than that in Moog."' As to the contention that
Universal's competitors, not the public, would be the prime bene-
ficiaries of the selective enforcement, that factor is probably present
in every selective enforcement case, and the Supreme Court in Moog
clearly demanded that that decision be left to the Commission."9
Finally, the fact that the FTC chose to prosecute a violatoi who con-
trolled only a small part of the retail market 30 while not prosecuting a
larger competitor should not give rise to an automatic finding of abuse
of discretion. It is true that the size of the alleged violator would be
a relevant factor for the Commission to take into account in deciding
whom to prosecute; and if the court could have drawn the inference
that the Commission either had totally failed to weigh that factor or
had given it unreasonably little weight, it might legitimately have
concluded that the Commission had abused its discretion. But the
court, not having made such a finding, should not have disturbed the
FTC's judgment on this ground. The relevance of the dealer's size
lies in the impact of its unlawful activity on the market. Certainly
determining this impact, and balancing it with other factors, calls for
as much administrative expertise as does determining the effect on
competition of a particular order's taking effect.3 ' Furthermore, it
4 See note 5 mupra and accompanying text.
2 352 F.2d at 834-35.
2 6 Professor Davis thinks that the prosecuting power is much abused and that
the court's action in Universal-Rundle was correct and a portent of future case law
-i.e., closer control over enforcement discretion. Davis, "Judicial Control of Ad-
minstrative Actioie': A Review, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 635, 649-50 (1966).
27 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
2 8The Court refused to affirm the stay in Moog despite petitioner's claim that
such refusal would result in his "economic extinction." See C. E. Niehoff & Co. v.
FTC, 241 F.2d 37, 42 (7th Cir. 1957).
29 355 U.S. at 413. See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 mipra.
30 Universal had only 5.75% of the market. 352 F.2d at 834.
31 See text accompanying note 4 mtpra. But see Address by Commissioner Jones
Before the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Feb. 25, 1965, quoted in
Universal-Rundle Corp. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1965) :
Industry-wide enforcement of the law is almost a constitutional imperative
as a matter both of fairness and equality before the law. It is clear that we
have no right to and could nct prmit some violators to go free while prose-
cuting others.
1966]
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may take much longer to investigate a large firm than a small one and
during that difference in time the innocent small retailer would have
to continue to pay illegally high prices.3"
Thus, the three grounds on which the Seventh Circuit rested its
decision in Universal-Rundle do not support a finding of an abuse of
discretion, in the absence of a finding-apparently not made by the
court-that the Commission had either totally ignored these factors,
or had given them unreasonably little weight. The court, however,
could have validly reversed for an abuse of discretion if it found that
the Commission had included an irrelevant factor in its determination
or had given unreasonable weight to a relevant factor. Universal's
original request for a stay pending investigation of its competitors was
denied by the Commission on the ground that such an investigation
"would conflict with an investigation now being conducted by the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice." " The remaining
questions, then, are whether such an investigation by another depart-
ment of the government is a factor which the Commission can consider
in deciding whom to prosecute and, if this is a relevant factor, whether
the Commission assigned to it unreasonably great weight.
The court in Universal-Rundle apparently thought that the in-
vestigation by the Justice Department was not a factor to be considered
by the agency. It stated that such an investigation could "not qualify
as an investigation by the Commission, which in our opinion, was the
agency which was called upon to act in all matters pertaining to the
case at bar." 4 This statement was erroneous. The investigation
could qualify in two ways: if the Department would be enforcing the
Robinson-Patman Act and, even if not, if the investigation would in
some way further the purposes of federal policy in the area." The
Justice Department and the FTC have overlapping jurisdiction in
prosecuting antitrust and Robinson-Patman Act violations.36 There
has been much criticism of that overlap " and the two bodies have
32 Holding the FTC's order in abeyance would mean that small retailers not
buying in quantities large enough to get the unlawful discount would continue suffering
their own economic distress since, if Universal's allegations are true, no producer will
have been compelled to sell to them at fair prices. Further, if large quantity buyers
are to get their unlawful discounts-discounts not based on decreased seller costs-
the small buyer will probably pay a resultingly inflated price. It was exactly these
small retailers that the Robinson-Patman Act was meant to protect. See, e.g., FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-5 (1936); 80 CONG. REC. 8102-03 (1936); ZORN & FELDMAN, BUSINESS
UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 46 (1937).
83 352 F.2d at 835.
24 Ibid.
35 See the statement in Universal-Rundle that the investigation, "although not
involving Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, might indicate whether that section was
being violated." Ibid.
36 See FTC v. Cement Inst, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE
TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 193 (1963).




attempted to eliminate much of it by yielding when the other has com-
menced an investigation of the same company. 8 It is reasonable to
assume that Congress was conscious of the overlap of jurisdiction, and
it seems reasonable to infer from the statutory scheme a congressional
intent that each body take into consideration the actions of the other
in regulating in the overlap area; the alternative is to attribute to
Congress an intent to create waste and duplication of effort. Thus, an
investigation by one pursuant to such overlap could, in some situations,
be a relevant factor which Congress intended the FTC to consider
before prosecuting suspected violators. The court should not have
reinstated that overlap without first discerning the purpose of the
Department's investigation, the subject of its inquiry, its scope, its
possible results and, if the investigation were relevant, whether the
agency gave an unreasonable weight to that factor.
On the other hand, even if the court had properly found that the
investigation was merely collateral and not in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the Robinson-Patman Act, or that, while relevant, it was
given unreasonable weight, there is still the question of the appropriate
remedy. The court's order 9 can be read as directing the Commission
to stay the enforcement order until it investigates all of Universal's
competitors. This reading would be at variance with language of the
Supreme Court in Moog.'°
The Court in Moog noted that the Commission must have dis-
cretion in deciding how best to allocate its time and resources.41 Thus,
even if the court had properly decided that consideration of the Depart-
ment of Justice investigation constituted an abuse of discretion, it
should still have remanded to the agency for further consideration. The
court had no way of knowing what the FTC would decide to do after
a judicial determination that such an investigation was not legally
relevant or was given an improper weight. It is possible that the
Commission might still refuse to prosecute Universal's competitors on
other grounds, even, perhaps, on the ground that it desires not to spend
its allocated time and money in investigating petitioner's competitors.
The Commission may believe that stopping petitioner from selling at
unlawful prices will have some beneficial effect on competition-e.g.,
voluntary obedience by Universal's competitors-and perhaps make
available a retailer who will sell at a fair price to all small buyers, even
38 See Loevinger, The Department of Aistice and the Antitrust Laws, in VAN
CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAws 90, at 205 (1963).
39 352 F.2d at 835.
40 See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra. Fortunately, the court's order in
Universal-Rundle is so ambiguous that it might be read only to order a stay until
further consideration of Universal's petition for a more complete stay. This would
be appropriate under the suggested analysis, and would be a proper balance between
judicial protection against administrative abuse and agency autonomy.
41355 U.S. at 413.
46 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:40
those who now buy at a higher price from Universal's competitors.'
Thus, on finding an abuse of discretion, the court should have remanded
to the Commission for further findings; it should not have imposed on
the Commission what it thought would be an appropriate disposition
of the case, thereby foreclosing the further exercise by the Commission
of the discretion vested in it by Congress.
42Thus, it is even possible that Universal might benefit by being forced to sell
at lower prices; what it loses in high prices, it may gain in quantity. Of course this
is unlikely since Universal must be assumed to know its best interests.
